David Barash, PhD

Ban the Bomb. This has been a hope, a dream, and a goal of millions of people worldwide for more than 50 years. While pro-military advocates have claimed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is an impossible ideal, many other experts in peace and security have developed practical plans, backed by techniques for verification, to remove nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

For the first 45 years of the nuclear arms race, disarmament advocates sought the total abolition of nuclear weapons, only to be stymied by political resistance, psychological barriers, and the immense obstacle imposed by the ongoing US-Soviet rivalry. The "Cold War" made it difficult for moderates to imagine a world not dominated by conflicts between the superpowers.

Protesting the arrival of the Trident submarine, Seattle waterfront, August 2, 2000.

Now, with the Cold War finally over, there is a terrific opportunity to achieve the genuine elimination of nuclear weapons. Admittedly, the "genie cannot be put back in the bottle" — that is, the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons cannot be undone — but the weapons themselves can be deconstructed. Numerous specific suggestions have been made for "vertical disarmament," dramatic reductions in nuclear stockpiles worldwide, as well as for "horizontal disarmament," the physical separation of warhead and missile components so that no country could quickly make use of whatever weaponry they may retain. With long-range (satellite) as well as on-site verification, there is no question that such developments are technically feasible; the only thing lacking is political will.

Ironically, at a time when it is most attainable, the future of nuclear disarmament is very much at risk. On the positive side, the total number of deployed warheads in the combined Russian and American nuclear arsenals has declined significantly from a peak of around 65,000 in 1985 to about 18,000 in 2000 (with another 16,000 in storage). Yet after signing the START II Treaty in 1993, formal negotiations on START III have still not even begun. In fact, START II has not yet entered into force. (See Treaties section) Additionally, the collapse of the Soviet Union has raised concern about the control of nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and in other parts of the former Soviet Union (the problem of "loose nukes"). Most ominously, perhaps, political and military developments in the Russia and especially in the US regularly threaten to halt, if not reverse, progress made in nuclear disarmament.

The major current roadblock has been pursuit by the United States of a series of policies that threaten to undermine American-Russian relations. These include:

• The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance, which has moved NATO's borders closer to Russia and appear to be offensive (at least to wary Russian nationalists);
• A determination to deploy "theatre" (e.g., localized) and national missile defenses (along with the avowed determination of the Bush Administration to scrap the ABM Treaty);
• Insistence on preserving the capability to rapidly expand the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal;
• Aggressively sponsoring research on new nuclear weapons designs;
• And the U.S. Senate's refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, combined, in 2001, with the Bush Administration's announced opposition to that agreement. (See Treaties section)

During the 1990s, the US government was notably lacking in creativity or even, perhaps, interest in pursuing nuclear disarmament, a hesitation that has long bedeviled all governments: fears of being considered "soft on defense." To make matters worse, the United States continues its military spending at close to Cold War levels, and the Bush Administration has announced itself not only uninterested in nuclear abolition, but positively hostile to it. Furthermore, despite unquestioned nuclear and conventional weapons superiority, the United States has never adopted a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons.

For Russia, collapse of its economy and its conventional military power has led the armed forces to rely more on nuclear weapons in defense planning (seeking to obtain "more bang for the buck" or, we might say, "more rubble for the ruble"). This has led to Russia renouncing the previous Soviet policy of no-first use of nuclear weapons. Since the U.S.S.R.'s collapse, the Russian parliament has been dominated by political forces that are highly skeptical of American intentions and of further disarmament initiatives. It has been preoccupied with economic stagnation, political infighting and corruption, and military challenges by would-be secessionist provinces, such as Chechnya. Uncooperative American military policies, meanwhile, have provided Russian hard-liners with further justification for resisting nuclear disarmament, and even arms control.

Nonetheless, numerous opportunities exist to take advantage of the (possibly fleeting) window of opportunity opened by the collapse of Soviet communism. These include a "consolidate-monitor-dismantle" initiative that would encompass the thousands of tactical nuclear warheads (not covered by the strategic arms control reduction process), and place them under secure control, in preparation for dismantlement. United States and Russian forces could take thousands of strategic nuclear warheads off hair-trigger alert, which would reduce the risks of accidental nuclear war. (See De-alerting section) A START III Treaty could be promptly negotiated and rapidly brought into force, establishing levels of around 1,000 to 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads (still many more than are needed for any reasonable degree of deterrence). From this point, actual nuclear disarmament would be within reach, and negotiations could begin to accomplish a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased elimination of nuclear weapons. (See Treaties section) Retraining and alternative employment opportunities can also be made available for nuclear weapons designers, to insure that their expertise is not diverted to nuclear "wannabe" nations. Overall, the United States should recognize that nuclear security can be most effectively achieved by bilateral and multilateral initiatives that dismantle threatening weapons, rather than insisting on "going it alone."

Putting this more strongly: The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union has given humanity the opportunity to free the world of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, if not literally and for all times, then at least practically, as realistic threats to national and species survival. The abolition of nuclear weapons is a realistic goal, which would make the world safe enough to deal with environmental, political, and economic challenges. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the entire ecosystem and biosphere is at risk of extinction. If we fail to seize this opportunity — whether through stubbornness, distrust, fear of the unknown, or simple inertia — posterity may never forgive us.

David Barash, PhD
July, 2001